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Abstract:  
We develop a dynamic bio-economic model of bacterial resistance and disease 
transmission in which we characterize the pricing policy of a monopolist who is protected 
by a patent. After expiration, the monopolist behaves competitively in a generic industry 
having open access to the common pool of antibiotic efficacy and infection. The 
monopolist manages endogenously the levels of antibiotic efficacy as well as the 
infected population, which represent quality and market size respectively and achieves, 
at least temporarily, higher such levels than a hypothetically myopic monopolist who 
does not take into account the dynamic externalities. The pricing policy and the 
biological system are characterized by the turnpike property. Before the patent vanishes, 
the monopolist behaves more and more myopically, leading to a continuous decrease in 
the price of the antibiotic. Once the generic industry takes over, a discontinuous fall in 
price occurs. Whether a prolongation of the patent is socially desirable depends on the 
relative levels of antibiotic efficacy and infection. 
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1 Introduction
Pharmaceutical firms that produce an antibiotic are usually given temporary monopoly
power through a patent, granted in order to recover the incurred investment in R&D and
by this to encourage future innovation of new drugs. The granting of this monopoly power
ignores the fact that this also gives the firm some control over the levels of the drug’s
treatment efficacy on the one hand, as well as of the infected population on the other. This
control stems from the fact that the antibiotics sold to the community help cure the infected,
and thus decreases the level of infection, at least in the short run. However, a too intensive
use of antibiotics within the community may lead to an increase in the bacterial resistance
of the drug – the mirror image of its treatment efficacy – via the natural selection of drug-
resistant bacteria over time.1 The purpose of this paper is to study this aspect of the pricing
policy of a monopolist whose market is protected by a patent and who is aware of the existing
externalities. Whether the monopolistic pricing policy is socially desirable as compared to
the subsequent generic industry is also considered.
Bacterial resistance to antibiotics has recently attracted the interest of economists. Most
have put the emphasis on the determination of the socially optimal use of the antibiotic
over time, ignoring the analysis of the market outcome. These include Laxminarayan and
Brown (2001), Rudholm (2002), Wilen and Msangi (2003), Rowthorn and Brown (2003)
and Gersovitz and Hammer (2004). Very few have considered explicitly how the market will
allocate the antibiotic use over time. Fischer and Laxminarayan (2005) is an exception, as are
Herrmann and Gaudet (2009) and Mechoulan (2007). Fischer and Laxminarayan (2005) treat
the problem as that of the sequential exploitation by a monopolist of exhaustible resources
pools (the stock of efficacy of the antibiotics) when a setup cost must be incurred to access
the next pool of resource (the next antibiotic). They show that whether the monopolist
exploits the efficacy of the existing antibiotic faster or slower, and hence introduces the new
drugs sooner or later than is socially optimal, depends on whether there are many or few
1See Levy (1992) for a useful overview of the subject of antibiotic resistance.
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new drugs left to be developed. Herrmann and Gaudet (2009) model a generic industry
as composed of antibiotic producers that have open access to the common resource pool of
antibiotic efficacy and compare the market outcome in this case to the social optimum. It
is shown that, depending on the bio-economic parameters of the model, in particular the
cost of production and the increase in the recovery rate that results from treatment, the
steady-state level of antibiotic efficacy that results from the generic industry may be lower
or higher than is socially optimal. Mechoulan (2007) shows in a highly stylized model of
disease transmission that while a social planner prefers eradication of infection (if possible),
a monopolist achieves a steady state with a positive level of infection. Adding intertemporal
resistance built-up to the model, the author concludes that re-activating patent rights may
be socially desirable if the increase in resistance is sufficiently high.2,3
It is shown in this paper that a monopolist who benefits from a patent on the sale of an
antibiotic, and who takes into account the effect of his sales on the efficacy of his antibiotic
(the quality of his product) and on the evolution of the infected population (his market size),
will tend to price so as to spend a period of time in the neighborhood of the steady-state
price of an infinitely-lived monopolist. The length of the period of time in question will
depend on the patent life. Thus, if the patent life is long enough, the price path will at
first decrease towards the steady-state price of the infinitely-lived monopolist, remain in the
neighborhood of this price (or possibly exactly on it) for an interval of time, and leave it as
the end of the patent approaches. In that final phase, the monopolist acts more and more
as a myopic monopolist, that is one who neglects the impact of his decision on the evolution
of the antibiotic efficacy and the stock of infected population. As a result, price decreases
2In a much earlier contribution, Tisdell (1982) has argued that a monopoly may result in a socially
optimal use of the drug, given the externality that results from antibiotic use. More recently Horowitz and
Moehring (2004) have argued, using a diagrammatic analysis, that antibiotic resistance will tend to increase
when the patent on an antibiotic expires which is also one of our findings in this paper for a particular class
of bio-economics parameters.
3In connection to the vaccine market, Kessing and Nuscheler (2006) build a static model to analyze the
monopoly pricing of a vaccine when demand for it is negatively affected by the expected rate of immuniza-
tion. The monopolist exploits this externality, leaving poorer individuals untreated in order to increase the
willingness-to-pay for the vaccine by richer individuals.
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until it reaches the price charged by a myopic monopolist, just as the patent expires. The
industry is then taken over by generic producers, with open access to the stock of efficacy
of the antibiotic, and the price jumps down to average cost. Whether the turnpike property
just described is exact or not and what length of time is spent near or at the infinitely-lived
monopoly price depends on the bio-economic parameters and on the length of the patent life.
The welfare implications of changing the duration of the patent depend on the state of the
system and the time at which the announcement becomes effective. We find that prolonging
the patent is only socially desirable when the level of infection is relatively low compared to
the level of antibiotic efficacy. In fact, relatively higher levels of infection are contained more
efficiently under a generic industry, as it charges a lower price implying more individuals to
buy the antibiotic.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the epidemiological and economic
models are presented. The monopolistic programme is characterized in Section 3. Two
benchmark cases, which are the myopic monopolist and the infinitely lived monopolist are
also considered for comparison in that section. The welfare implications of prolonging the
patent are described in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Model
The model has an epidemiological and an economic component. The epidemiological com-
ponent (the so-called SIS-model) is borrowed from the epidemiological literature (see for
instance Bonhoeffer et al., 1997). It has already been used before in the economics literature
by, among others, Laxminarayan and Brown (2001), Wilen and Msangi (2003) and Herrmann
and Gaudet (2009). The economic component involves the interaction of the monopolist (on
the supply side) with a derived demand for the antibiotic first presented in Herrmann and
Gaudet (2009). We present the epidemiological model and the demand side of the economic
component in what follows.
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2.1 The epidemiological model
We assume that there is only one antibiotic treatment available to fight a particular infection.
The infected population (I) is made up of those suffering from a drug-susceptible version of
the infection (Iw) and those suffering from the drug-resistant version (Ir), both versions being
naturally present in the system. The problem of antibiotic resistance arises as the bacterial
strain causing the drug-resistant version of the infection becomes predominant in the system,
since the drug-susceptible bacterial strain clears at higher rate under antibiotic treatment.
This effect is generally referred to as natural selection, on which we will concentrate here.4
In such a context, an appropriate measure of antibiotic treatment efficacy (w) is the ratio
of the population being infected with the drug-suspectable version to the overall infected
population, i.e. w = Iw/(Iw + Ir) = Iw/I.
We assume the overall population to be constant and equal to N . The healthy population
is then given by S = N − I. Let β be the rate of transmission of the infection between the
healthy and the infected population. The SIS-model assumes that the rate of addition at time
t to the infected population, either drug-resistant or drug-susceptible, is given by βS(t)Ir(t)
and βS(t)Iw(t) respectively. The infected individuals may recover naturally, that is without
taking the antibiotic. We denote the natural recovery rates from the drug-resistant and
the drug-susceptible infection by rr and rw respectively. If all the infected individuals are
treated with the antibiotic, the rate of recovery of those infected with the drug-resistant strain
remains unchanged, while the rate of recovery of those infected with the drug-susceptible
strain increases to rw + rf . If a fraction f ∈ [0, 1] of the infected population is being treated
with the antibiotic, the rate of recovery of those infected with the drug-susceptible strain will
be rw+frf . Hence the total infected population decreases at the rate rrIr(t)+(rw+frw)Iw(t).
The population dynamics can be summarized by the following system of differential
4Antibiotic resistance may not only be caused by natural selection, but also by the mutation of drug-
susceptible strains when being continually in contact with the antibiotic, or by the transfer of plasmids, i.e.
genetic material transferred from resistant towards susceptible strains and containing information on how to
be resistant. See for instance Levy (1992).
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equations:
I˙w = (βS − rw − frf )Iw
I˙r = (βS − rr)Ir (1)
S˙ = −I˙ = −I˙w − I˙r.
Note that the evolution of the healthy population (S˙) is the complement of the evolution of
the infected population (I˙), since we have assumed the overall population to be constant.
Using this fact and the definition of antibiotic efficacy, we can rewrite system (1) as:
w˙ = w(1− w)[∆r − rff ] (2)
I˙ = I(β(N − I)− rr + w[∆r − rff ]) (3)
where ∆r = rr− rw measures what is called in the epidemiological literature the fitness cost
of resistance. The fitness cost can be understood as an opportunity cost of the resistant
bacterial strains: they remain unaffected by antibiotic treatment, but this ability comes at
the cost that they clear at a higher rate than drug-susceptible strains in the absence of
antibiotic treatment.
We can now point out two important effects in the biological system that are apparent
in equation (2): a positive fitness cost ∆r implies renewability of the resource of antibiotic
efficacy (fitness cost effect), while the additional recovery rate rf helps clear drug-susceptible
infections, leading potentially to the dominance of the drug-resistant version of the infection
(natural selection effect). If a fraction f = ∆r/rf of the infected population is treated
with the antibiotic, those two effects cancel out. For all other admissible values of f , either
one effect dominates, leading to an increase or decrease in the level of antibiotic efficacy.
Assuming that both the fitness cost effect and the natural selection effect are apparent in
the system, we must have ∆r/rf < 1.
There exist three steady-state configurations to the epidemiological dynamics described
by (2) and (3). Let wSS and ISS denote the steady-state values of w and I respectively. For
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any f 6= ∆r/rf , we have w˙ = 0 for w = 0 or w = 1 and there are two distinct steady states,
given by:
(ISS, wSS) =
(
βN − rr
β
, 0
)
and (4)
(ISS, wSS) =
(
βN − rw − rff
β
, 1
)
(5)
For f = ∆r/rf , we have w˙ = 0 for any value of w and hence all
(ISS, wSS) =
(
βN − rr
β
, w ∈ [0, 1]
)
(6)
constitute steady states. We will assume throughout the paper that the biological parameters
imply that the infection cannot be eradicated, nor dominate the whole system, so that the
steady states of infection must be interior, 0 < ISS < N .5
If the treatment rate f were to remain constant over time, then, in order to reach the
steady state at which wSS = 1, the fraction, say f1, of the infected population being treated
must satisfy f1 < ∆r/rf . The steady state w
SS = 0 will be reached if a fraction, say f2,
gets treatment over time with f2 > ∆r/rf . For the corresponding steady-state levels of the
infected population, this implies
βN − rr
β
<
βN − rw − rff1
β
Thus the steady state at which antibiotic efficacy reaches its upper bound (wSS = 1), corre-
sponds to a relatively higher level of the infected population than the steady state at which
antibiotic efficacy is lowest (wSS = 0). For an interior steady state of w, which is reached if
a fraction, say f3, of the infected population gets treatment, with f3 =
∆r
rf
, the steady-state
level of infection is equal to (βN − rr)/β.
5Thus, we must have βN − rr > 0 for steady states (4) and (6) to be interior. The positiveness of steady
state (5) is implied by the fact that it can only be reached with f < ∆r/rf < 1 for an initial value of
antibiotic efficacy w0 < 1. It order to assure a positive level when w0 = 1, we assume βN − rf − rw > 0. We
also want to make sure that the system doesn’t become dominated by infection when out of steady state.
Assuring that less individuals fall ill than are healthy if recovery rates were zero (βSI < S), it can be shown
that a sufficient condition for this is β < 1/N . For the particular case of a perfectly efficient drug (w = 1),
assuring infection to remain present when there are no healthy individuals left in the system (S = 0) is
implied by the sufficient condition I˙w = −[rw + rf ]Iw < Iw, or rw + rf < 1.
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A representative evolution of the state variables starting from an interior state (I0, w0)
and corresponding to the cases f1 and f2 just described is illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 1
represents a phase diagram and shows the I˙-isocline and the corresponding forces driving
the system when away from the isocline (as indicated by the arrows) under the two different
regimes corresponding to the treatment rates f1 or f2.
6 In the case of f1 < ∆r/rf the
continuous lines apply, and the system tends to the steady state at which wSS = 1, since
the fitness cost effect dominates. In the case of f2 > ∆r/rf the dashed lines apply, and
the system tends to the steady state at which wSS = 0, since the natural selection effect of
resistant bacterial strains dominates. For f = ∆r
rf
, both effects cancel out so that the level
of antibiotic efficacy remains constant and the system converges to a steady state as defined
in (6) (not shown in the Figure).
The crucial point is that the dynamic system is non-stationary with respect to the treat-
ment rate f . If f changes over time, the I˙-isoclines will also change. Values of f closer to the
critical value ∆r/rf imply steeper I˙-isoclines. If the sequence of f converges monotonously
to ∆r/rf from above or from below, the isoclines will pivot around the point ((βN−rr)/β, 0)
and the dynamic system will converge to an interior steady state (see for instance Herrmann
and Gaudet (2009) for the case of the generic industry).
2.2 The demand
The market demand for the antibiotic is derived under three main assumptions. First, we
assume that individuals are vertically differentiated with respect to their valuation θ of being
in good health, the distribution function of which is F (θ) over the population N . Second,
we assume that consumers do not behave strategically, thus abstracting from consumers
stockpiling (or waiting to buy) antibiotics when an increase (or decrease) in price is expected.
Third, we assume that infected individuals do not know whether they suffer from the drug-
6Analytically, the I˙-isocline is derived by setting I˙ = 0, which gives I = 0 or w = w˜(I) = β(I−N)+rr∆r−rff .
For f < ∆r/rf , the isocline has a positive slope, while it is negative for f > ∆r/rf . If f equals the critical
fraction ∆r/rf , the I˙-isocline is a vertical line passing through ISS as defined in (6).
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resistant or the drug-susceptible versions of the disease. However, we assume that they
know the current treatment efficacy of the antibiotic, w(t), and the natural recovery rates
from either infection. If the spread of infection and the valuation of being in good health are
independent events, the probability of recovering from infection without antibiotic treatment
is pi(w) = wrw + (1 − w)rr. With antibiotic treatment, recovery from infection will occur
with a higher probability of [pi(w) + wrf ].
7
The gross utility derived from health considerations by the individual of type θ will
therefore be given by:
u(θ) =

θ if in good health
pi(w)θ if infected and not taking the antibiotic
[pi(w) + rfw]θ if infected and taking the antibiotic.
Only infected individuals whose valuation of being in good health is sufficiently high will
buy the antibiotic. Denote by θ˜ the type who is indifferent between buying the antibiotic
or not when infected. The value of θ˜ is determined by: pi(w)θ˜ = [pi(w) + rfw]θ˜ − p, which
means that
θ˜ =
p
rfw
. (7)
Thus infected individuals with θ ≥ θ˜ will buy the antibiotic and those with θ < θ˜ will not.
The fraction of the infected population willing to buy the antibiotic is [1−F (θ˜)], and, since
individual demand is unitary, total demand is given by: Q = I
[
1− F
(
p
rfw
)]
. Therefore
the inverse demand function is: P
(
Q
I
, w
)
= rfwF
−1 (1− Q
I
)
. For simplicity, let us assume
that θ is distributed uniformly over the population, with supports [0, 1]. The inverse demand
function then becomes: P
(
Q
I
, w
)
= rfw
(
1− Q
I
)
. Notice that the intercept of the inverse
demand is rfw and its slope is rfw/I. The variable w can be viewed as an (endogenous)
index of the quality of the drug, which can vary between zero and one, while I is the market
size for the antibiotic. For w = 0, demand is identically zero. For a given value of the infected
population, I, the inverse demand curve pivots upwards through the point (Q, p) = (I, 0) as
7Using the aforementioned assumptions on the biological parameters allows to show that the last two
expressions are indeed positive and smaller than unity.
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the quality of the antibiotic increases from zero to one and demand is at its highest when
w = 1.
The ratio Q/I represents the fraction of the infected population treated and is thus equal
to the parameter f in the dynamic constraints (2) and (3). The inverse demand function can
therefore be rewritten as a function of the fraction of the infected population being treated
and the efficacy of the antibiotic to give:
P (f, w) = rfw(1− f). (8)
3 The monopolistic pricing behavior
We assume that a patent exists, assigning exclusive rights to a monopolistic firm to sell the
antibiotic for an exogenously given period of time T ∈ (0,∞], after which the antibiotic is
sold by a generic industry.8 A non-myopic monopolist is characterized by the fact that he
takes into account the impact of his current decisions on future levels of antibiotic efficacy
and infection, and thus on the evolution of the quality of his product and its market size
over time. Hence, the quality and market size of the antibiotic are determined endogenously
in the system.9 The instantaneous profit function of the monopolist is given by Π(t) =
[rfw(t)(1− f(t))− c]f(t)I(t), where c is the constant unit cost of the antibiotic. For ease of
reference to the epidemiological model, we will treat the fraction of the infected population
to which the antibiotic is sold, f(t), as the control variable, and infer the market clearing
price p(t) from the inverse demand function. The objective function of the monopolist is
given by:
max
{0≤f(t)≤1}
∫ T
0
e−ρtΠ(t)dt+ V g(T ) (9)
8We thus abstract from the R&D process before the patent is granted. Kingston (2000) presents historical
notes on the R&D of the first antibiotics, and addresses aspects related to the patenting process of antibiotics.
9The management of antibiotic efficacy (and infection) by the monopolist may reveal impossible if bacteria
can easily become cross-resistant to several antibiotics. In such a case, even if a monopolist were to sell fewer
amounts of the antibiotic over time, the level of antibiotic efficacy may decline due to an intensive use of other
antibiotics on behalf of other producers, which are linked to the same resource pool of antibiotic efficacy. In
the limit, open-access to that pool may arise, leaving the monopolist without any influence on the quality
of his patented product.
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subject to the equations (2) and (3). The bequest function V g(T ) accounts for the profits of
the former monopolist once he has become one of the competitive producers of the generic
industry after the expiration of the patent. Assuming that all generic producers have access
to the same technology as the monopolist does, the equilibrium in that generic industry will
be such that price equals the average production cost and economic profits are zero. Hence
V g(T ) = 0. Such a generic industry and the resulting evolution of antibiotic efficacy and
infection are addressed in Herrmann and Gaudet (2009).10
This optimization program contrasts with that of a myopic monopolist, who takes the
quality and market size at each instant of time as given and who does not take into account
the long-run effects of his current decisions. As a consequence, a myopic monopolist maxi-
mizes (9) neglecting the dynamic constraints (2) and (3). We will treat this subsequently as
one of two benchmarks.
With respect to the non-myopic monopolist, the current-value Hamiltonian associated to
problem (9) is given by:
H(f, w, I, µ, λ) = [rfw(1− f)− c]fI
+µw(1− w)[∆r − rff ] + λI(β(N − I)− rr + w[∆r − rff ]) (10)
and its derivative with respect to the control variable f is:
∂H
∂f
= [rfw(1− 2f)− c]I − rfw[µ(1− w) + λI], (11)
where µ and λ are the shadow values associated to the level of antibiotic efficacy and the
stock of infected population respectively.
The following conditions, as well as (2) and (3), are necessary for inter-temporal profit
10The entry decision of a generic firm may depend on the market size and revenues of the incumbent firm
before the patent expires, and also of the type of the pharmaceutical product sold, as shown empirically by
Scott Morton (2000), leaving some antibiotic markets potentially without any generic competition.
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maximization:
∂H
∂f
≤ 0, ∂H
∂f
f = 0, f ≥ 0 or ∂H
∂f
≥ 0, ∂H
∂f
(1− f) = 0, f ≤ 1 (12)
µ˙− ρµ = (∆r − rff)[µ(2w − 1)− λI]− rfI(1− f)f (13)
λ˙− ρλ = λ[2βI − βN + rr − w(∆r − rff)]− rfw(1− f)f + cf (14)
lim
t→T
e−rtw(T ) ≥ 0, lim
t→T
e−rtµ(T ) ≥ 0, lim
t→T
e−rtµ(T )w(T ) = 0 (15)
lim
t→T
e−rtI(T ) ≥ 0, lim
t→T
e−rtλ(T ) ≥ 0, lim
t→T
e−rtλ(T )I(T ) = 0 (16)
Condition (12) is the first-order condition for the maximization of the Hamiltonian with
respect to f(t) at each instant t. It can never be optimal for the monopolist to sell the
antibiotic to the overall infected population (f = 1). This makes current profits negative
without generating compensating future profits. Indeed setting f = 1 inevitably decreases
the level of antibiotic efficacy and infection, or at least decelerates the increase in the level
of infection, and thus negatively affects the future quality and market size of the antibiotic.
We will therefore necessarily have ∂H/∂f 5 0. However, it may be optimal to have f = 0,
thus postponing production and allowing antibiotic efficacy and infection to rise as fast as
possible.
Conditions (13) and (14) are the arbitrage equations that determine the evolution of
µ(t) and λ(t) over time. Conditions (15) and (16) are the transversality conditions. In
the case of a finite patent life, they state that whenever there is a strictly positive stock
of antibiotic efficacy or of the infected population left at the end of the patent lifetime
(w(T ) > 0, I(T ) > 0), then that stock must be of no value to the non-myopic monopolist.
The same reasoning applies in the limit as t tends to infinity in the case of an infinitely long
lasting patent.
In the case of an interior solution, (0 < fm < 1) , equation (12) can be written as:
rfw(1− 2fm) = c+ rfw
I
[µ(1− w) + λI] . (17)
Condition (17) states that the marginal revenue (the left-hand side of equation (17)) must
be equal to the full marginal cost of treatment (the right-hand-side ). Both shadow values
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will be positive. This reflects the fact that the stock of the infected population can be
viewed as an “asset” by the monopolist, since it represents market size when the antibiotic
is economically viable.11
An interior solution fm is represented graphically in Figure 2, where the solid and dotted
lines represent the downward-sloping demand and marginal revenue function respectively.
This figure shows a momentary view of the monopolist’s choice given the dynamic system
is in state (w, I) at time t. As in the standard static monopoly model, the monopolist will
always serve a fraction such that demand is elastic, ruling out admissible values of f in
the interval (1/2, 1]. The reason for this is the same as the reason why f = 1 cannot be an
optimal policy for the monopolist. Incurring a loss at a current instant of time would have to
be compensated by higher profits somewhere in the future. But this is not the case, since such
a policy would lead to lower levels of quality and market size and thus cannot lead to higher
profits. This implies that whenever ∆r/rf ∈ [1/2, 1], the fitness cost effect dominates, i.e.
the level of antibiotic efficacy will be increasing over time, as the optimal fraction f served
by the monopolist will always be lower than 1/2 (for c > 0). For ∆r/rf ∈ [0, 1/2), the
fraction served by the monopolist may be lower, equal or higher than the critical value of
∆r/rf , implying an increasing, constant or decreasing movement of antibiotic efficacy over
time.
Before turning to the monopolist that benefits from a limited patent lifetime, we will
address two useful benchmark cases. The first one has already been mentioned and refers
to the myopic monopolist, while the second one is that of an infinitely-lived, non-myopic
monopolist, the analysis of which will allow us to determine the steady states of the system.
11Herrmann and Gaudet (2009) characterize the socially optimal use of an antibiotic. In that case, the
level of infection represents a bad to society, such that a negative shadow value is attributed to it, while
antibiotic efficacy still is a valuable asset. At the social optimum then, the price of the antibiotic – not its
marginal revenue – is equalized to the full marginal cost of antibiotic use, which may be lower than the
marginal production cost due to the negative shadow cost of infection.
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3.1 The myopic monopolist
In this section we consider the pricing policy, and its impact on the dynamics of antibiotic
efficacy and infection, when the antibiotic is sold by a myopic monopolist. The myopic
monopolist maximizes the flow of discounted profits without taking into account the impact
of his current decision, f(t), on future levels of antibiotic efficacy, and on the future stock of
the infected population. He thus attributes a zero shadow value to the quality and market
size of the antibiotic, which implies µ(t) = 0 and λ(t) = 0. This optimization problem could
be interpreted as a “static” one within a continuously changing environment. Accounting
for the implied zero shadow values in equation (12), the first order condition for an interior
solution can be written as:
rfw(1− 2f)I = cI, (18)
i.e. marginal revenue equals marginal production cost, which is the producer’s “short-run”
cost of antibiotic use. Denote by f∞(t) the fraction of the infected population buying the
antibiotic when sold by a myopic monopolist, and by p∞(t) the corresponding price. From
condition (18) we obtain:
f∞(t) =
{
1
2
(
1− c
rfw(t)
)
, if rfw > c
0 , otherwise.
(19)
With the inverse demand function stated in (8), we get:
p∞(t) =
{
1
2
(rfw + c) , if rfw > c
rfw , otherwise.
(20)
If the antibiotic is economically viable, the myopic monopolist sells it to a positive fraction of
the infected population and charges the corresponding market clearing price. If the antibiotic
is not economically viable, he charges the choke price rfw, and does not sell at all. Both, the
fraction of the infected population buying the antibiotic, f∞(t), as well as the price charged
by the myopic monopolist, p∞(t), are increasing in the level of antibiotic efficacy, the quality
aspect of the antibiotic, while f∞(t) is decreasing and p∞(t) is increasing in the unitary
production cost c. Notice that they are both independent of the level of infection.
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3.1.1 The steady states under myopic monopolistic pricing
Consider first the epidemiological steady state given by (4), at which the level of antibiotic
efficacy is exhausted completely (wSS = 0) and demand vanishes. Any positive production of
the antibiotic would lead to losses for the myopic monopolist, so that the monopolist would
find it optimal not to produce at all by setting fSS = 0. The steady state would therefore
be characterized by: (
fSS, ISS, wSS
)
=
(
0,
βN − rr
β
, 0
)
(21)
With a positive production cost c > 0, this steady state can be ruled out. This is because
the myopic monopolist, by setting f∞(t) = 0 whenever the antibiotic is not economically
viable, allows the level of antibiotic efficacy to recover (w˙ > 0), and therefore it cannot reach
its lower limit at which wSS = 0.
In the epidemiological steady state given by (5), the quality of the drug is maximal. From
(19), we find f∞ = (1− c/rf )/2. Therefore, the steady state will be characterized by:
(
fSS, ISS, wSS
)
=
(
1
2
(
1− c
rf
)
,
βN − rw − 12(rf − c)
β
, 1
)
. (22)
Finally, steady states as defined in (6) occur when f∞ = ∆r/rf , which is only optimal
for the myopic monopolist whenever the level of antibiotic efficacy w(t) satisfies:
∆r
rf
=
1
2
(
1− c
rfw(t)
)
. (23)
Hence the unique steady state of this type is given by:
(
fSS, ISS, wSS
)
=
(
∆r
rf
,
βN − rr
β
,
c
rf − 2∆r
)
, (24)
for the case where parameters satisfy rf > 2∆r, i.e. the natural selection effect dominates
the fitness cost effect.
Notice that the steady-state configurations (22) and (24) are mutually exclusive. Which
one is relevant depends on the bio-economic parameters of the model. To be more precise,
if c = rf − 2∆r, they are indistinguishable at wSS = 1. Whenever c < rf − 2∆r, then (24)
15
must be the relevant steady-state configuration, because this is incompatible with (19) when
evaluated at wSS = 1. Whenever the parameters satisfy c/(rf − 2∆r) > 1, or rf < 2∆r
then (22) must be the relevant steady-state configuration, because it must then be the case
that wSS = 1 and fSS = (1 − c/rf )/2 < ∆r/rf . The economic intuition of which steady
state applies is clear. The steady state of type (22) applies independently of the production
cost c, if the fitness cost effect dominates the natural selection effect (rf < 2∆r), assuring
a strong renewability of the drug efficacy. As the myopic monopolist behaves like a static
one, selling on the elastic part of the demand curve, such that f∞ < 1/2 < ∆r/rf , antibiotic
efficacy necessarily increases and converges to wSS = 1. However, if the natural selection
effect dominates the fitness cost effect, then both steady state are possible depending on the
relative magnitude of the production cost.
3.1.2 The transition to steady state under myopic monopolistic pricing
The stock of infected population I(0) = I0 ∈ (0, N ] and the stock of antibiotic efficacy
w(0) = w0 ∈ (0, 1) are given exogenously in the system at time t = 0. One could conjecture
on the one hand, that a newly developed drug is characterized by an efficacy level that is
relatively close to unity and lies above or below its steady state. On the other hand, the level
of infection may initially lie on its steady-state value, or in the case of an infection “event”,
it may lie above it. In what follows, we will show that the system will tend asymptotically
from an initial state (I0, w0) to the relevant steady-state configuration. Let I and II denote
states for which w > wSS and III and IV denote states for which w < wSS, with states I and
III lying to the left of the I˙ = 0 isocline, while states II and IV lie to its right in (I, w)-space.
This is shown in Figure 3 for the steady-state configuration (24), where the I˙ = 0 isocline
is represented for f∞ = ∆r/rf , at which the natural selection and fitness cost effects are in
balance.12 The evolution of the levels of antibiotic efficacy w(t) and infection I(t) depends
on the fraction of the infected population f∞(t) to which the myopic monopolist sells the
12The I˙ = 0 isocline is non-stationnary. Recall footnote 6. The ensuing analysis also applies to the
steady-state configuration with wSS = 1 where the initial state (I0, w0) is either of type III or IV.
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antibiotic over time, or equivalently, on the price charged p∞(t).
We first concentrate on the characterization of f∞(t), p∞(t) and w(t), before addressing
the evolution of the level of infection and the transition to steady state in general. Differ-
entiating equations (19) and (20) with respect to time for any steady-state configuration
gives:
f˙∞ =
c
4rf
(2∆r − rf ) 1− w
w2
[
w − c
rf − 2∆r
]
(25)
p˙∞ =
r2fw
2
c
f˙∞ (26)
Suppose for now the antibiotic to be economically viable. If the steady-state configuration
is of type (22), we have w(t) 5 wSS = 1 with t ∈ [0,∞) so that:
f∞(t) =
1
2
(
1− c
rfw(t)
)
<
1
2
(
1− c
rf
)
<
∆r
rf
,
implying by equation (2) the level of antibiotic efficacy w(t) to be increasing over time
for initial states of types III and IV. This steady-state configuration occurs only when
c/(rf − 2∆r) > 1 or rf − 2∆r < 0 and thus implies, by equations (25) and (26), that
the fraction served as well as the price charged by the myopic monopolist must be increasing
over time. This is because the increase in quality shifts the demand and marginal revenue
curves upwards (for any given level of infection). As the level of antibiotic efficiency ap-
proaches its upper bound, the increase in the treatment rate and in the price slow down as
f˙ and p˙ tend to zero.
If the steady-state configuration is of type (24), we have for any t ∈ [0,∞):
f∞(t) =
1
2
(
1− c
rfw(t)
)
T ∆r
rf
⇔ w(t) T c
rf − 2∆r = w
SS,
where wSS is the steady-state level of antibiotic efficacy in that configuration. Hence, the
fraction f∞(t) is larger, smaller or equal to the critical fraction ∆r/rf depending on whether
the current level of antibiotic efficacy w(t) is larger, smaller or equal to the long-run steady-
state level wSS. It follows that w(t) is decreasing over time when the initial state is of type
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I or II, and increasing when it is of type III or IV. If w0 = w
SS, then the level of antibiotic
efficacy remains constant over time (w˙ = 0). Convergence of w(t) to steady state will occur
monotonously (from above or from below). As w(t) approaches the long-run steady state
wSS, f˙ and p˙ tend to zero, and the fraction served must tend to the critical value of ∆r/rf .
When the steady-state value for antibiotic efficacy is reached, wSS = c/(rf − 2∆r), we must
simultaneously have f∞ = ∆r/rf from equation (23) and ˙f∞ = 0 from equation (25).
We have seen so far that the evolution of the variables w, f∞ and p∞ can be characterized
independently from the level of infection, or the market size of the antibiotic, I, the evolution
of which we now consider. Equation (3), which determines the evolution of the level of
infection, can be rewritten, after substituting for f∞ and rearranging, as:
I˙
I
= β(ISS − I) + 1
2
(rf − 2∆r)
[
wSS − w] (27)
where ISS and wSS are defined as in the relevant steady-state configuration (22) or (24).
Equation (27) states that the relative increase in the level of infection is a function of the
relative distance of the state variables from their long-run steady-state levels. Suppose
(rf − 2∆r) > 0 such that no steady-state configuration can be excluded from the outset.
Then, unambiguously, I˙ < 0 as long as I > ISS and w > wSS, and I˙ > 0 as long as I < ISS
and w < wSS. Now suppose the particular case where I0 = I
SS and w > wSS. Thus, the
initial state is of type II, and by equation (27), I˙(0) < 0, i.e. the level of infection falls below
its steady-state level, such that ISS−I > 0 initially while we still have w > wSS. The level of
infection will decrease, making the difference ISS − I increase, while wSS −w(< 0) increases
as shown earlier. The first term on the right-hand side of equation (27) eventually cancels
the second one. When this happens, we have I˙ = 0, i.e. the system crosses the I˙-isocline
and switches from type II to type I. After this, we have I˙ > 0, and ISS − I decreases while
wSS − w(< 0) increases. This continues until the steady state is reached. The overshooting
of the level of infection which may occur when departing from an initial state of type II is
reversed when departing from a state of type III.13
13If c/(rf − 2∆r) > 1 holds, the level of antibiotic efficacy tends to its upper bound. The steady state is
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To summarize, assume that the marginal cost of producing the antibiotic is relatively low,
and that the efficacy level of a newly patented antibiotic is relatively high (initial state of
type I or II). Based on the preceding analysis, a myopic monopolist will price the antibiotic
such that some of the antibiotic efficacy is “extracted” over time, with the system converging
to a “sustainable” steady state, at which the fitness cost effect and the natural selection effect
are in balance. This happens because consumer demand adjusts to the decreasing level of
antibiotic efficacy, a fact which the monopolist takes into account, ignoring however the
evolution of infection. An overshooting in the level of infection may occur depending on the
location of its initial state when a relatively high (mild) use is made of the antibiotic, the
efficacy of which is relatively high (low).
3.2 The infinitely-lived monopolist
The case of an infinitely-lived monopolist (T = ∞) represents another benchmark for the
analysis of how a non-myopic monopolist subject to a patent manages antibiotic efficacy and
infection over time. As it turns out, the infinitely-lived monopolist tends to achieve higher
levels of antibiotic efficacy over time and in steady state than the myopic monopolist. The
non-myopic control also benefits the spread of infection, asit prevents the level of infection
from falling as sharply below its steady-state value as in the myopic outcome. This is because
the non-myopic infinitely-lived monopolist prices the antibiotic at a level where the marginal
revenue equals the full marginal cost of selling the antibiotic.
3.2.1 The steady states
Setting w˙ = I˙ = µ˙ = λ˙ = 0 generates the set of steady states that may be reached when
the antibiotic is sold by a non-myopic monopolist. The epidemiological steady state of type
then as defined in (22). Unambiguously, I˙ < 0 for states of type IV, while the overshooting pattern may occur
for states of type III (I > ISS temporarily). The same steady state is reached if the condition rf − 2∆r < 0
holds, and I˙ < 0 for states of type IV and the overshooting pattern with respect to the level of infection
may then occur for initial states of type III. The discussion in the text shows that the system will reach the
neighbourhood of the relevant steady state, and in connection with the local stability of that steady state
(which can be shown by standard methods of linearizing the dynamic system around the relevant steady
state), establishes its global stability under the myopic monopolistic programme.
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(4), at which the antibiotic is completely inefficient (w = 0), and which we found could
not be reached under the myopic monopolistic programme, cannot be reached either under
the non-myopic programme. As before, the monopolist would incur losses by selling the
antibiotic when its efficacy is below the economic viability level (w < c/rf ). He would prefer
not to sell at all (f = 0), allowing the level of antibiotic efficacy to increase.
In the epidemiological steady state given by (5), antibiotic efficacy is at its upper bound
(w = 1). Replacing w = 1 in (12) and in (14) with λ˙ = 0 yields two equations in f and λ,
the unknowns of which can be solved for (see the Appendix). At this steady state we will
therefore have:
(fSS, ISS, wSS) =
(
a
2
−
√(a
2
)2
− b, βN − rw − rff
SS
β
, 1
)
(28)
where a and b are determined in the Appendix as:
a =
2
3rf
[ρ+ βN − rw + rf − c]
b =
(
1− c
rf
)
(ρ+ βN − rw)
3rf
.
Finally, there is a unique steady state of the type characterized by (6). This steady state is
shown in the Appendix to be given by:
(fSS, ISS, wSS) =
∆r
rf
,
βN − rr
β
,− B
2A
+
√
c
A
+
(
B
2A
)2 (29)
where
A = ∆r(rf −∆r) βN − rr
ρ(ρ+ βN − rr)
B = (rf − 2∆r)−∆rrf −∆r
ρ
+
∆rc
ρ+ βN − rr .
Steady-state configurations (28) and (29) are mutually exclusive. In fact, when wSS = 1 in
(29) they are indistinguishable with respect to the level of antibiotic efficacy. This will occur
when the bio-economic parameters satisfy
c = c˜(rf ) =
−∆r [2(βN − rr + ρ)−∆r]
βN − rr + ρ−∆r + rf , (30)
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which can be derived from setting wSS = 1 and solving for the cost c. For c ≤ c˜(rf ), the
monopolistic steady state will be defined as in (29), while for c > c˜(rf ) the steady state will be
defined as in (28). Equation (30) represents a positively sloped straight line in (rf , c)−space,
the intercept of which is negative when infection cannot be eradicated from the system.14
Figure 4 shows the line c˜(rf ), as well as the economic viability condition c = rf in
the (rf , c)−space for admissible values of rf ∈ [2∆r, βN − rw]. Ceteris paribus, for any
given value of the cost c, higher values of the additional recovery rate rf (and thus lower
values of the critical fraction ∆r/rf ) imply an interior steady-state level of antibiotic efficacy
(configuration (29)). This is because the optimal fraction of the infected population served by
the monopolist, f , as defined in (12), is then higher than the critical fraction ∆r/rf , which
leads to a decreasing level of antibiotic efficacy and makes the steady-state configuration
given by (28) unattainable. Stated differently, a high value of the additional recovery rate rf
implies a relatively high selective pressure on the drug-sensitive version of the infection (Iw),
rendering the achievement of the maximum value of antibiotic efficacy (wSS = 1) impossible.
Comparing the interior steady-state configurations of the myopic and the non-myopic
monopolist as defined in (24) and (29) shows that both the fraction of the infected population
that buys the antibiotic, fSS, and the level of the infected population, ISS, are identical.
The steady-state levels of antibiotic efficacy differ however in this steady-state configuration.
It can be shown, assuming c/(rf − 2∆r) < 1, that the non-myopic steady-state level wSS
is always higher than the one reached under the myopic programme: wSS > c
rf−2∆r ≡ wSS∞ ,
indicating that the non-myopic, infinitely-lived monopolist considers antibiotic efficacy as
a valuable asset. The locus of parameter configurations such that wSS∞ = 1 is given by
c = rf − 2∆r and is also shown in Figure 4.
14Whenever the denominator on the right-hand side of equation (30) is positive, the ordinate is negative.
This is indeed the case as βN−rr+ρ−∆r > βN−rr−∆r = βN−2∆r−rw > βN−rf −rw > 0, where the
last inequality follows from the assumption made in footnote 5 and the next-to-last inequality follows from
rf − 2∆r > 0, which makes the evolution non-trivial as both, the fitness cost and natural selection effects
exist.
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3.2.2 The transition to steady state
Because of the complex nature of the dynamic system involved in the monopolistic optimal
control problem, numerical simulations have been used to explore the transition to the steady
state.15 Those simulations show that depending on the bio-economic parameters of the
model, the system may tend to the steady state as defined in (28), for which wSS = 1, or
to the “interior” steady state as defined in (29), for which fSS = ∆r/rf . In what follows,
we concentrate our analysis on the production cost c and the additional recovery rate rf ,
and refer to the classification of steady states as presented in Figure 4. Recall, that this is a
benchmark analysis. It will allow us subsequently to qualify the “turnpike” evolution of the
system in the case of a finite patent life.
Suppose the parameter configuration of c and rf is such that they fall below the line
c˜(rf ), and the steady state reached is interior for the monopolist as defined in (29). Starting
from the four different types of initial states (I0, w0), indicated by I to IV, the trajectories
of the state variables and of the evolution of the monopolistic treatment rate are shown
in Figures 5 and 6 respectively. For comparison, we have also drawn the paths resulting
under the myopic programme. In Figures 5 and 6 non-myopic paths are indicated by thicker
lines. All state paths have in common that they converge towards their respective steady
state, indicating that the dynamic system is stable under both regimes, with the non-myopic
steady-state level of antibiotic efficacy being greater than the myopic one, i.e. wSS > wSS∞ .
Consider the paths departing from initial states of types III and IV, which lie below the
economic viability level c/rf , such that no antibiotic is sold initially under any regime. Since
the evolution of antibiotic efficacy w˙ is independent of I, myopic and non-myopic state paths
departing from an initial state of types III and IV coincide as long as f = 0. Before that
15We make use of a standard value function iteration algorithm, as proposed in Judd (1998, page 413) for
a discrete time version of the model. The baseline parameters used throughout the rest of the paper assure
that infection can neither be eradicated, nor dominate the system. We retain for our simulations, unless
specified differently for comparative dynamics: β = 0.6, N = 1, rr = 0.17, rw = 0.15, ∆r = 0.02, rf = 0.3,
c = 0.1 ρ = 0.03, although many other parameter configurations are conceivable. They do however not lead
to qualitatively different results with respect to how the policy of the infinitely-lived, non-myopic monopolist
compares to that of the myopic one.
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phase ends, the paths of the state variables join in a unique path (see Figure 5). Once the
antibiotic has become economically viable, the myopic monopolist immediately starts selling
to a fraction f∞ as defined in (19), which again does not depend on the level of infection.
The two myopic state and control paths therefore continue to coincide and converge to the
steady state (24). The convergence occurs with a slight overshooting in the level of infection
as described in section 3.1.2. Although the non-myopic monopolist reaches the economic
viability level at the same time as the myopic one, he starts selling later as can be seen from
Figure 6. This is because the non-myopic monopolist attributes positive shadow values to the
levels of antibiotic efficacy and infection, implying a full marginal cost higher than c. During
this phase we thus have ∂H/∂f < 0, i.e. the monopolist waits for the quality to rise even
more in order to compensate for the full marginal cost, and starts selling when ∂H/∂f = 0.
For the non-myopic monopolist, the positive overshooting pattern is more pronounced than
for the myopic one, as he has an interest in facing a ‘high’ demand in the future.
Consider now the initial states of type I and II in Figure 5, characterized by a high level
of antibiotic efficacy – which one may conjecture for a newly developed and patented drug
– and a relatively low (type I) or high (type II) level of infection. When departing from
an initial state of type I, the monopolist manages the initially low level of infection (the
market size), in such a way as to have it increase faster than the myopic monopolist while
keeping high values of antibiotic efficacy. Comparing the treatment rates in Figure 6 under
both regimes, it becomes apparent that the non-myopic monopolist sells to a low fraction
of the infected population initially, thus allowing the level of infection to increase relatively
fast.16 When departing from an initial state of type II, the non-myopic monopolist serves
a decreasing fraction, and this at a lower level than the myopic monopolist initially. This
allows him to soften the overshooting of infection below its steady-state level, thus assuring
a relatively higher market size over time (see Figure 5). As can be seen from Figure 6, the
non-myopic monopolist sells to a higher fraction of the infected population in the longer run
16The level of antibiotic efficacy also increases initially, something which cannot occur under the myopic
regime.
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than the myopic one. This is due to subsequently higher levels of antibiotic efficacy and
is advantageous because the level of infection is also higher. It is interesting to note that
the decisions of a non-myopic monopolist crucially depend on his discount rate. Notably, it
can be shown numerically that a higher discount rate makes the non-myopic monopolist less
patient. Figure 7 (upper left) shows the trajectory of the state variables for a non-myopic
monopolist corresponding to the baseline discount rate, as well as to a higher one, when
departing from initial states of type I and II. It turns out that the overshooting pattern is
more pronounced for an initial state of type II and that the steady-state level of antibiotic
efficacy is lower. Thus, a more impatient monopolist does “invest” less in future market
size and quality with the benefit of higher, present profits. This is reflected by the state
path lying closer to the one of the myopic monopolist. Figure 7 also shows the comparative
dynamics with respect to the parameters c, β and rw.
Figure 8 displays the evolution of prices and the level of antibiotic efficacy when the
initial state is of type II. Prices are decreasing under both regimes and reflect the evolution
of antibiotic efficacy. We have also drawn the hypothetical price pH(t), that a myopic
monopolist would charge if he were to be at the same state (I, w) as the non-myopic one.
The prices charged by the non-myopic monopolist are higher than those charged by the
hypothetical myopic monopolist, thus restricting the fraction of the infected population to
which the antibiotic is sold, and finally leading to a higher steady-state value of antibiotic
efficacy.
If bio-economic parameters c and rf belong to the region lying between the line c˜(rf ) and
the economic viability line (c = rf ), as depicted in Figure 4, initial states (I0, w0) can only
be of type III or IV, as has been explained earlier for case of the myopic monopolist (recall
footnote 13). Numerical simulations confirm that the system now tends to the steady state
of type (28). The convergence to that steady state is similar to what has been described
before with respect to the initial states of type III and IV. Leaving unchanged the biological
parameters, notably rf , this case occurs for example for a sufficiently higher value of the
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production cost c, implying at the same time an economic viability level which is higher.
3.3 Finite patent life: T <∞
Consider now the realistic case of a patent of finite duration (T < ∞). The antibiotic is
then sold by a monopolist during the life of the patent and by a generic industry afterwards.
Since the monopolist knows that he will make zero economic profits after the expiration of
the patent, he will attach no importance to the levels of antibiotic efficacy and infection
that are left for the generic industry. At time T , he should thus attribute zero value to the
levels of antibiotic efficacy and infection, if positive, and behave like a myopic monopolist.
This is indeed the case, as can be seen from the transversality conditions (15) and (16).
As the monopolist cannot operate below the economic viability level, c/rf , nor eradicate
infection from the epidemiological system, we must have w(T ) > 0 and I(T ) > 0, which
from equations (15) and (16) implies:
µ(T ) = λ(T ) = 0. (31)
Hence, at the instant the patent expires, the pricing policy of the non-myopic monopo-
list must be identical to the myopic one defined in (19) and (20) and evaluated at state
(I(T ), w(T )). The shadow values will evolve continuously over time as described by equa-
tions (13) and (14) and will reach µ(T ) = λ(T ) = 0 at time T .17 At T , we can calculate the
rate of change in the shadow values making use of (31) and obtain:
µ˙(T ) = −rfI(T )(1− f(T ))f(T ) < 0,
λ˙(T ) = −rfw(T )(1− f(T ))f(T ) < 0.
Due to the continuity in the evolution of the shadow values, we can conclude that the shadow
values are positive and decreasing at least during a time period before the patent’s expiration.
This implies a decreasing full marginal cost for given levels of antibiotic efficacy and of the
17Jumps in the shadow values could be caused by binding constraints on the state variables. This can
however be excluded as wSS = 0 and wSS = 1 cannot be reached in finite time and infection cannot be
eradicated nor dominate the whole system because of the parameter values assumed in section 2.1.
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infected population, leading to an increase in the fraction of the infected population served
towards the end of the patent life time in order to satisfy equation (12). The non-myopic
monopolist thus behaves “more and more myopically” as the patent approaches its expiration
date.
Numerical analysis shows for the parameter configuration which would lead to the interior
steady state in the infinite horizon problem, as defined in (29), that the non-myopic monop-
olistic programme is characterized by a turnpike property with the steady state (ISS, wSS)
serving as the turnpike. If T , the length of the patent life, is sufficiently large, then the turn-
pike is “exact”: the system reaches the steady state and remains there for a finite period of
time before leaving it at some point before the patent expires.
Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the trajectories of antibiotic efficacy and infection, as well
as the fraction of the infected population that buys the antibiotic when it is sold by a non-
myopic monopolist. We also plot the outcome under the myopic monopolistic regime for
purpose of comparison. The approach to the steady state is identical to that of the infinite
horizon problem, which has been described in the preceding section. At the interior steady
state (ISS, wSS), we have fSS = ∆r/rf . What is of interest in the case of a finite patent life
is the monopolistic policy once the path leaves the turnpike. The monopolist then sells to
an increasing fraction of the infected population, f(t) > fSS, as can be seen in Figure 10.
This leads to a decrease in the levels of antibiotic efficacy and infection (the state trajectory
moves in the south-western direction in Figure 9), and thus to a decreasing price as shown in
Figure 11. This occurs because the monopolist associates lower shadow values to the quality
aspect of the drug (w) and to the market size (I), as he knows that he will make zero profits
after the patent has expired and tends to behave more and more like a myopic monopolist.
At time T , the non-myopic monopolist behaves exactly like a myopic monopolist and charges
the myopic price as defined in (20). To see this, consider the prices charged by a hypothetical
myopic monopolist pH(t) who faces the same state as the non-myopic one in Figure 11. It is
at T that the pricing schemes p(t) and pH(t) represented by the thin continuous and dotted
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lines join.
For an insufficiently long patent life, the turnpike property of the monopolistic programme
is not exact: the path approaches the steady state (ISS, wSS) and remains in its neighborhood
for a finite period of time before leaving to satisfy the transversality conditions. This is shown
in Figure 12, where we depict the trajectories of the fraction of the infected population
buying the antibiotic as an example. The heavy lines indicate the treatment rates f(t) for
the non-myopic monopolist, which finally approach the steady-state level of ∆r/rf from
above when departing from initial states of type I and II, and which approach it from below,
when departing from initial states of type III and IV. In all cases, the treatment rate f(t)
increases towards the end of the patent and trajectories of f(t) eventually join and reach the
same level, which is higher than the critical level (∆r/rf ).
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When the patent expires, the generic industry takes over, and an upward jump in the
level of f(t), accompanied by a fall in price occur. As the full marginal cost faced by the
monopolist is equal to c at time T , the corresponding monopolistic price pm(T ) is necessarily
higher than the price of the generic industry which is given by pg = c.
Finally, consider the parameter configuration under which the infinitely-lived monopolist
would reach the steady state of type (28). In this case, if the patent life is sufficiently long,
the system is again characterized by an exact turnpike, with the level of antibiotic efficacy
reaching its upper bound, w = 1. The level of w will remain unchanged, even after leaving
the turnpike in order for the costate variables to satisfy the transversality conditions. The
decrease in the full marginal cost, which occurs after leaving the turnpike, is due strictly
18The question arises of what is the critical patent life T for an exact turnpike to exist. And in such a case,
when is the turnpike reached, and when is it left again. The critical value of T is determined implicitly by the
necessary conditions (12) to (16) characterizing the profit-maximizing monopolistic programme. Suppose
T to be sufficiently long such that a turnpike exists. Denote by t1 and t2 the points of time when the
turnpike is reached, and when it is left again. In order to obtain those dates, one would have to solve the
differential equations w˙, I˙, µ˙, λ˙ satisfying condition (12) and the boundary conditions w(0) = w0, I(0) = I0,
w(t1) = w(t2) = wSS , I(t1) = I(t2) = ISS , µ(t1) = µ(t2) = µSS , λ(t1) = λ(t2) = λSS and µ(T ) = 0 as
well as λ(T ) = 0. One would first solve for t2, and then for t1. The critical value for a turnpike to exist, T˜ ,
is then defined by T˜ = t1 + t2. All those conditions should suffice to determine a unique trajectory of the
state, co-state and control variables. The analytical resolution of the dynamic system however represents an
arduous task.
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to the decrease in the shadow value of infection, λ. This can be seen from equation (17),
which simplifies for w = 1 to: rf (1 − 2fm(t)) = c + rfλ(t). As in the previous case, a
falling full marginal cost is accompanied by an increase in the treatment rate, leading to a
decrease in the level of infection. What differs under this parameter configuration, which is
characterized by a marginal production cost (c) that is high relative to the increase in the
recovery rate (rf ), is that the generic industry now inherits a perfectly effective antibiotic
drug. The problem of antibiotic resistance would be non-existing after the generic industry
takes over – a rather unrealistic conjecture for the parameter values. Indeed, one should not
interpret this result as arguing in favor of the monopolistic industry from a social optimum
point of view. The upper bound of antibiotic efficacy may also be attained by a generic
industry under similar parameter configurations (see Herrmann and Gaudet, 2008). It is the
relatively high marginal production cost compared to the increase in the recovery rate that
makes the monopolist conservationist on the one side, and the generic industry “disciplined”
on the other. In the real world, one may conjecture that the R&D costs are most important
and that the marginal production cost is relatively low in the pharmaceutical industry.
Finally, we want to emphasize that the monopolistic outcome is not socially optimal, no-
tably because infection represents a bad to society and an asset to the monopolist. Inducing
a socially optimal behavior of the monopolist via economic incentives, like taxes or subsidies,
is possible and they could be easily calculated in theory. It remains however a difficult task
in reality, as they depend on regulation and insurance regimes, the analysis of which lies
outside the scope of the present paper.19
4 Prolonging the patent length and related welfare implications
A prolongation of the patent at its termination date will be welfare-improving if it brings
the intertemporal use of the antibiotic closer to what would be socially optimal, as has been
characterized in Herrmann and Gaudet (2009). This issue has already been raised by regula-
19For a descriptive discussion of the problems that may be involved in the context of the U.K. National
Health Service system, see Coast et al. (1998).
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tory and governmental authorities. In particular, a prolongation has been proposed (but not
adopted by Congress) by the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (1995) as an incentive for
the pharmaceutical industry to take into account the negative externality of antibiotic resis-
tance. In our model, prolonging the patent, and hence the non-myopic monopolistic pricing,
results in a reduction of the fraction of the population that buys the antibiotic as compared
to the generic industry. This benefits the evolution of antibiotic efficacy, but comes at the
cost of an increase in infection levels, at least in the short run. Hence, one can conjecture
that a prolongation of the patent may be desirable from a societal point of view if antibiotic
efficacy levels are low, and if the spread of infection is not much of an issue.
In what follows, we make the important assumption that changes in the patent duration
at T are not anticipated by the monopolist. This allows us to abstract from a potential
strategic behavior by the producer of the drug, the analysis of which lies outside the scope of
this paper. The instantaneous welfare W at time t is defined as the surplus accruing to the
entire population, net of production costs. Making use of the indifferent consumer θ˜ defined
in (7) and the inverse demand function P (f, w) defined in (8), we calculate:
W (f, w, I) = N
∫ 1
0
u(θ)dθ − cfI
=
1
2
(N − I) + 1
2
pi(w)I +
1
2
rfwIf
2 + [rfw(1− f)− c]fI (32)
While the first term of equation (32) represents the mean valuation of the healthy population,
and the last term is the producer surplus, the second and third terms relate to the expected
surplus of the infected population of either recovering naturally, or by taking the antibiotic.
The intertemporal welfare is the sum of the welfare occuring under monopoly and under the
generic industry, which inherits the final state (I(T ), w(T )) from the monopolist at time T
when the patent ends. Since the monopolist faces a deterministic profit-maximizing program,
we know that the final state (I(T ), w(T )) is determined unambiguously by the initial state
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(I0, w0) and the length of the patent T . We can therefore write:
V (I0, w0, T ) =
∫ T
0
e−ρtWm(fm, .)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Vm(.,T )
+
∫ ∞
T
e−ρtW g(f g, .)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡V g(.,T )
= V m(I0, w0, T ) + e
−ρT
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtW g(f g, .)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡V˜ g(I(T ),w(T ))
, (33)
where Wm and W g represent the instantaneous social welfare when the fraction fm or f g
of the population buys the antibiotic and the state of the system evolves accordingly. Dif-
ferentiating V (I0, w0, T ) with respect to T gives the marginal welfare change at time T of
increasing the patent length:
dV
dT
= e−ρT
[
Wm(fm(T ), .)− ρV˜ g(I(T ), w(T )) + ∂V˜
g
∂w(T )
∂w(T )
∂T
+
∂V˜ g
∂I(T )
∂I(T )
∂T
]
(34)
The sum of the terms in brackets is the net current value at time T of marginally increasing
the patent duration. The first two terms capture the immediate “gain” in current social wel-
fare under monopoly, Wm, corrected for the “cost” of postponing the intertemporal welfare
procured by the generic industry, ρV˜ g. The other two terms take into account the impact of
the change in the final state (I(T ), w(T )) on the discounted welfare procured by the generic
industry.
Since the sign of this expression is ambiguous, numerical simulations are used to address
the welfare change implied by a modification in the patent length. Numerical simulation
results are presented for various percentage increases in the patent length from its initially
given value. This requires a new dynamic program for the monopolist to be solved with the
horizon set at T˜ = xT where x is the percentage of the prolongation and with the initial
state being (I(T ), w(T )). The bio-economic parameters used for the numerical simulations
are those from the baseline scenario (see footnote 15) with T = 200 time periods. Figure 13
refers to the state-space at time T . The particular final state (I(T ), w(T )) from the baseline
scenario is also shown. The Figure shows the contour lines of a zero welfare change (dV = 0)
for a small increase in the patent length, dT = 1%, and for longer increases in T up to
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20% of the initial patent length. To the left of a contour line, we have dV/dT > 0, while
dV/dT < 0 to its right. The shape of the contour line corresponding to a given increase
in T confirms our intuition: a small increase in the patent length is only desirable from a
societal point of view if the level of antibiotic efficacy is low relative to the level of infection.
A longer prolongation of the patent duration is only socially desirable for an even lower level
of antibiotic efficacy compared to a given level of infection.
Figure 13 suggests that, given the state (I(T ), w(T )), a 1% prolongation of the patent
length would increase welfare, while a 2.5% or higher prolongation would not. This is because
replacing the generic industry by a non-myopic monopolist for the extra duration T˜ = xT
will result in a reduction of the fraction of the population that buys the antibiotic during
that time interval, because of the higher price. It results a higher infection level, which is an
asset for the monopolist, but a bad for society. This finding conveys an important nuance to
Mechoulan (2007) who shows that re-granting monopoly power to a non-myopic monopolist
may be welfare improving in the context of antibiotic resistance. When addressing the re-
granting of monopoly power, Mechoulan (2007) remains silent on the spread of infection, the
state and dynamics of which we have considered explicitly in our analysis. In our model,
a prolongation in the patent length can be welfare improving when the level of infection is
sufficiently low as compared to the level of antibiotic efficacy. Longer increases in the patent
duration necessitate even lower values of antibiotic efficacy in order to increase welfare.
Our analysis suggests that relatively higher levels of infection are contained more efficiently
under a generic industry, as a lower price is charged implying that more individuals buy the
antibiotic.
5 Conclusion
This paper has focused on the pricing of an antibiotic drug by a non-myopic producer whose
monopoly power is protected by a patent, in the context where the efficacy of the antibiotic
(its quality) and the overall level of infection (the market size) are endogenously determined
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by antibiotic sales over time. We show that the bio-economic system is characterized by a
turnpike property. This means that the price will move towards the steady-state price level
that would be charged by an infinitely-lived monopolist and will remain in the neighborhood
of that price for a period of time. The period of time in question will depend on the length of
the patent life. Towards the end of the patent protection, the monopolist will begin acting
more and more myopically, leading to a continuous decrease in price. When the patent
expires, a discontinuous fall in price occurs as the generic industry takes over. We argue
that, for reasonable bio-economic parameters of the model, the steady state which is targeted
by the monopolist brings two effects into balance: the fitness cost effect (benefiting antibiotic
efficacy) and the natural selection effect (favoring a dominance of the drug-resistant version
of the bacterial population). Thus, antibiotic efficacy will generally find itself somewhere
between its upper and lower bound over a period of time. In that case, it will, in the end,
start decreasing, as will the level of infection, reflecting the fact that the monopolist attaches
less and less value to the quality and the market size of the antibiotic as the patent nears
expiration.
We also find insight with respect to the welfare implications of a prolongation of the
patent. More particularly, it may be socially desirable to prolong the patent, if the level
of infection is sufficiently low compared to the level of antibiotic efficacy. However, this
result crucially depends on the proposed prolongation of the patent. A higher increase in
the patent duration implies that the monopolist behaves non-myopically over a longer period
of time and as such does not only benefit the evolution of antibiotic efficacy, but also favors
the spread of infection, which represents a bad to society.
It should be pointed out that our results are obtained under some assumptions concern-
ing the strategies available to the monopolist once the patent expires. For instance, the
monopolist may have the possibility of practicing price discrimination for a while, by selling
the brand name at a high price, and selling his own generic version before the patent has
expired. This might lead to a Stackelberg-type market structure during the generic phase of
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the industry. Another possibility that has not been taken into account is that the monopolist
may attempt to “improve” the biological formula of the drug slightly, at a cost, in the hope
of getting a new patent protection. Taking those additional possibilities into account would
of course have an impact on the price path during the period of patent protection, but would
not necessarily alter the underlying turnpike property described here. How exactly the price
path would be affected is however a matter for further research.
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Appendix
We first recall the full dynamic system, involving the state and co-state variables, which
the monopoly solution must satisfy. It is given by:
w˙ = w(1− w)(∆r − rff) (A–1)
I˙ = I(β(N − I)− rr + w(∆r − rff)) (A–2)
µ˙ = ρµ+ (∆r − rff)[µ(2w − 1)− λI]− rfI(1− f)f (A–3)
λ˙ = ρλ+ λ[2βI − βN + rr − w(∆r − rff)]− rfw(1− f)f + cf (A–4)
In addition, the first-order condition (12) for the maximization of the Hamiltonian must be
satisfied at every point in time, including at a steady state. A steady-state solution is given
by w˙ = I˙ = µ˙ = λ˙ = 0.
A The steady state with wSS = 1
Setting w = 1 in (A–1), we have w˙ = 0. Setting I˙ = 0, λ˙ = 0 and w = 1 in (A–2) and (A–4)
gives:
I =
βN − rw − rff
β
(A–5)
λ =
rf (1− f)f − cf
ρ+ βI
(A–6)
For convenience, we rewrite the first-order condition in (17) evaluated at wSS = 1
rfw(1− 2f) = c+ rfwλ. (A–7)
Replacing (A–6) into (A–7) gives an expression in the treatment rate f , which we solve for
to obtain:
f1,2 =
a
2
±
√(a
2
)2
− b (A–8)
where
a =
2
3rf
[ρ+ βN − rw + rf − c] (A–9)
b =
(
1− c
rf
)
(ρ+ βN − rw)
3rf
(A–10)
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Both values of f1,2 are admissible solutions, and we cannot exclude any of them analytically.
Our numerical simulations however suggest that the solution is unique and given by:
fSS =
a
2
−
√(a
2
)2
− b (A–11)
B The intermediate steady state with fSS = ∆r
rf
For an interior solution to the maximization of the Hamiltonian, f must satisfy equation
(17), in addition to (A–1)-(A–4). Setting f = fSS = ∆r/rf , we have w˙ = 0, from (A–1),
and from (A–2):
ISS =
βN − rr
β
. (A–12)
Setting µ˙ = 0 in (A–3) and substituting for fSS
∗
and ISS
∗
, we get the steady-state solution
for µ:
µSS =
∆r
rf
ISS(rf −∆r)
ρ
(A–13)
We still need to determine the steady-state levels of antibiotic efficacy, wSS, and of the
shadow price of infection, λSS. Setting λ˙ = 0 in (A–4) and substituting for fSS and ISS we
get:
λ =
∆r
rf
w(rf −∆r)− c
ρ+ βN − rr . (A–14)
Since fSS = ∆r/rf is the monopoly solution in this steady state, price p = rfw(1−∆r/rf )
must be higher than the marginal production cost c, implying a positive value of λ. Substi-
tuting for fSS, ISS, µSS and λ from (A–14) into (17), we get a binomial in w, the solutions
of which are:
w = − B
2A
±
√
c
A
+
(
B
2A
)2
(A–15)
where
A = ∆r(rf −∆r) βN − rr
ρ(ρ+ βN − rr)
B = (rf − 2∆r)−∆rrf −∆r
ρ
+
∆rc
ρ+ βN − rr .
35
The expression for A is positive, while the sign of B depends on the parameters of the model.
In order to exclude solutions with w < 0 for all B, the admissible solution for w is
wSS = − B
2A
+
√
c
A
+
(
B
2A
)2
. (A–16)
Depending on the set of parameters, we have wSS < 1 or wSS = 1. The condition wSS ≤ 1
can be written as:
c ≤ ∆r∆r − 2(ρ+ βN − rr)
ρ+ βN − rr −∆r + rf . (A–17)
In the case of a zero fitness cost ∆r = 0, the condition (A–17) becomes c ≤ rf , which is
always verified if the antibiotic is economically viable at the maximum value of antibiotic
efficacy (w = 1).
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Figure 5: Convergence to interior steady state
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Figure 6: Treatment rates converging to fSS = ∆r
rf
Note that trajectories f∞I and f
∞
II , as well as f
∞
III and f
∞
IV coincide with each other, as the myopic
treatment rate is a function of the level of antibiotic efficacy only. This also applies to fIII and fIV ,
as the non-myopic monopolist sets f = 0 at the beginning and the state trajectories join together
and then are confounded.
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Figure 7: Comparative dynamics of chosen parameters
An increase in the discount rate makes the non-myopic monopolist more impatient, as explained in
the text. A higher cost increases the steady-state value of w, while the overshooting of I is reduced
via lower treatment rates. A higher transmission rate increases the steady state of I, and lowers
slightly that of w (admittedly difficult to see). The qualitative impact of a decrease in rr parallels
that of increasing β, with the overshooting pattern being more pronounced (not shown). A higher
recovery rate from the susceptible strain (or due to antibiotic treatment) increases the overshooting
of I below its steady-state level, which is compensated by lowering w (not shown).
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41
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
c/rf
wSS
wSS
∞
ISS
I II
III IV
Stock of infected population (I)
An
tib
io
tic
 e
ffi
ca
cy
 (w
)
Figure 9: Evolution of state variables (I, w) and the turnpike
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Figure 10: Evolution of treatment rate f and the turnpike
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Figure 12: Evolution of treatment rate f with approximate turnpike
43
c/ rf
wSS
wSS
∞
ISS
 (I(T),w(T))
dT  = 20%T
dT = 10%T dT  = 5%T dT  = 2.5%T dT  = 1%T
dV/dT > 0  to the left of a contour line
dV/dT < 0  to the right of a contour line
Infected population (I)
An
tib
io
tic
 e
ffi
ca
cy
 (w
)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Figure 13: Welfare impacts of prolonging the patent length
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